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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted in 1966 to 
increase transparency in government operations by creating a public 
right of access to government information.1  Since its enactment, the 
power of FOIA has been eroded so that the Act is no longer able to serve 
its purpose as intended by Congress.  FOIA’s procedures were designed 
to replace the government’s practice of arbitrarily denying access to 
information simply by labeling it as “top secret,” “classified,” or as a 
threat to “national security.”2  However, government agencies continue 
to deny requests for information, using FOIA exemptions instead.3  The 
courts have facilitated the abuse of these exemptions by granting 
excessive deference to agency decisions to withhold information.4  If 
FOIA is to be an effective means for enabling the public to monitor its 
government, courts must conduct a more thorough review of agency 
decisions to withhold requested information. 
This Comment argues that courts should adhere to the de novo 
standard of review prescribed by Congress in the FOIA statute,5 and that 
this standard is necessary for FOIA to provide the public with the 
affirmative right to access government information.  Part I of this paper 
examines the reasons why FOIA requires the de novo standard of 
 1. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (2000)).  Before FOIA, the only laws governing public access to government 
information were section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 324., § 3, 60 
Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C § 551 (2000)), and the 
Housekeeping Act, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68, 68-69 (1789).  The Housekeeping Act was 
amended in 1958 to state that it “does not authorize withholding information from the 
public or limiting the availability of records to the public.”  Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 
547, 547 (1958) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)). 
 2. CHARLES S. STEINBERG, THE INFORMATION ESTABLISHMENT 16-17 (1980). 
 3. Agencies can utilize Exemptions 1, 3, and 7 of FOIA to deny access to 
information classified by Executive order because it is exempted according to another 
statute, and because releasing the information could interfere with law enforcement 
proceedings, respectively.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3), (7)(A) (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 
926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“It is . . . well-established that the judiciary owes some measure 
of deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive 
purview.”). 
 5. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (providing that “the court shall determine 
the matter de novo” in a case “to enjoin [an] agency from withholding agency records 
and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the 
complainant”). 
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review, and why courts ignore the requirement.  Part II discusses various 
standards of review used by courts reviewing agency actions outside 
FOIA litigation.  Specifically, it compares the review of agency 
adjudications and rulemakings to review under FOIA.  Part III analyzes 
the actual standards of review that are employed in cases involving 
Exemptions 1, 3, and 7(A) of FOIA and discusses how the de novo 
standard of review should be applied.  Finally, Part IV provides 
suggestions for strengthening and clarifying the role of courts in 
reviewing agency determinations that information should be withheld for 
national security reasons. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Judicial Review of Agency Actions 
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) entitles a person to seek 
judicial review of agency actions.6  The APA also lists the standards of 
review that are generally applied to agency actions.7  The “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard is the baseline standard of review for all agency 
actions.8  That is, all agency actions that are subject to judicial review 
are subject to review under this standard unless the APA or some other 
applicable statute provides a more stringent standard of review.  The 
APA requires application of the “substantial evidence test” in review of 
formal adjudications and formal rulemakings9 and de novo review in 
very limited circumstances.10  This leaves only informal adjudications 
and informal rulemakings subject to the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of review. 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Agency action must be set aside if the action is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or 
if it fails to meet requirements of law.  Id. 
 9. Formal adjudications and formal rulemakings differ from their informal 
counterparts in that the procedural safeguards provided in 5 U.S.C. § 556 and § 557 
apply to formal adjudications and formal rulemakings.  These statutes require that notice 
be given to the parties, that a trial-like proceeding take place, and that this proceeding be 
“on the record” such that meaningful and more thorough judicial review can take place.  
See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2000). 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F). 




The standards prescribed in the APA are preempted when another 
statute or the Constitution requires the court to use a different standard of 
review.11  For example, FOIA requires de novo review of agency 
decisions to deny FOIA requests.12
In FOIA cases, the issue before the court is whether the information 
withheld by the agency properly falls under the claimed FOIA 
exemption.13  Thus, under de novo review, courts should determine 
whether the requested material falls under the claimed exemption 
without any deference to the decision by the agency.14  The court should 
examine the record created in the agency’s determination, but then make 
its own determination as if the agency had not decided the matter.15  
However, courts do not conduct de novo review in practice.  Rather, 
courts explicitly and substantially defer to agency determinations 
regarding the applicability of FOIA exemptions.16  For example, 
consider the opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for 
National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice, where 
the court stated: 
 
 11. The Constitution provides a baseline for the adequate procedural safeguards of 
individual rights in agency actions through the Due Process Clause.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
 13. FOIA includes exemptions for nine categories of information.  These exemptions 
were included in recognition of the government interest in keeping certain types of 
information secret.  The exemptions stated briefly are as follows: (1) data classified under 
Executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; (2) data relating to the 
internal personnel rules and practices of the agency; (3) data exempted from disclosure by 
statute; (4) trade secrets or financial information obtained from an individual on a 
confidential basis; (5) interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) 
personnel and medical files which would constitute an invasion of privacy; (7) 
investigatory files compiled for purposes of law enforcement; (8) data relating to use by an 
agency responsible for the regulation of financial institutions (banks, for example); and (9) 
data concerning the geology and geography of oil wells.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 14. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that de novo 
judicial review under FOIA requires a consideration of “whether the conditions of 
exemption in truth exist”). 
 15. “When the agency action resulted from a proceeding in which a statute or the 
Constitution requires that the facts shall be subject to trial de novo, the court makes its 
own, independent findings of fact and determines whether the agency action is warranted 
thereby.”  Sec. of Admin. L. & Reg. Prac. of the A.B.A., A Blackletter Statement of 
Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 41 (2002) [hereinafter Blackletter 
Statement].  
 16. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(upholding summary judgment in favor of agency where the agency provided a 
reasonably detailed affidavit that was not called into question by contrary evidence in the 
record or evidence of the agency’s bad faith). 
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We have consistently reiterated the principle of deference to the executive in the 
FOIA context when national security concerns are implicated . . . .  Given this weight 
of authority counseling deference in national security matters, we owe deference to 
the government’s judgments contained in its affidavits.  Just as we have deferred to 
the executive when it invokes FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, we owe the same 
deference under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases, such as this one.17
The pervasiveness of this level of deference is illustrated by the estimated 
ten percent reversal rate of agency decisions over FOIA’s thirty-five year 
history.18  This percentage does not conclusively demonstrate that courts are 
conducting a more deferential review than the de novo standard would 
require, but it certainly suggests that they are.  It would be reasonable to 
hypothesize that if de novo review were employed, fifty percent of FOIA 
request denials would be reversed.19
B.  Judicial Deference in the FOIA Context 
By granting deference to agency decisions to withhold information 
under FOIA, courts reject Congress’s determination that de novo review 
should be required in the FOIA context.  This section examines and 
criticizes the possible justifications that courts might have for granting 
this deference. 
1.  Criticisms of the Justifications of Deference 
a.  Expertise 
The main reason cited by courts for increased deference toward 
agency decisions is the high level of expertise that agencies have in their 
field.  This reason is most often cited in cases involving national 
security.20  Because the agency’s expertise exceeds that of the courts in 
 17. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926-27 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). 
 18. Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 679, 713 (2002) (substantiating the estimation with a survey of all 
FOIA cases decided from 1990 to 1999, which revealed that just over ten percent of 
cases were reversed). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985) (deferring to the decision 
of the Director of the CIA that disclosure of the names and institutional affiliations 
of certain researchers in a government sponsored behavior modification program 
would reveal intelligence sources and methods (Exemption 3), the Court stated 
“[t]he decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with ‘the whole 




the agency’s field, courts argue, an agency’s determination about the 
applicability of the exemptions to the requested information should not 
be second-guessed.21
This reasoning is valid.  Judges conducting the review of agency 
decisions are generalists, while those making decisions and setting 
policies within the agency are typically specialists.  But the expertise of 
the agency is only one factor worth considering in determining how 
courts should review agency decisions under FOIA.  Other factors should 
include the strong ability of judges to make appropriate determinations 
under FOIA,22 the relative independence of judges in making such 
determinations,23 the low probability that agencies will always 
voluntarily comply with FOIA, and the importance of the civil rights that 
are at stake in FOIA litigation.24  These factors are discussed in further 
depth below. 
Congress has indicated its faith in the ability of the judiciary to make 
these judgments by specifically authorizing courts to review agency 
decisions under FOIA and to substitute their judgment for that of the 
agency when they deem it appropriate.  Statements made in congressional 
floor debates also indicate Congress’s faith in the ability of the judiciary to 
effectively review, and if necessary, reverse agency decisions to withhold 
information.25  Whether or not the judiciary considers itself able to make 
such determinations, courts are required to follow Congress’s mandate. 
b.  Economy 
Another reason that may account for the failure of courts to make a 
thorough review of claimed FOIA exemptions is one of judicial 
picture,’ as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the 
national security interests . . . at stake.”). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Congressman Moss did “not think we have to make dummies out of [judges] 
by insisting they accept without question an affidavit from some bureaucrat—anxious to 
protect his decisions whether they be good or bad—that a particular document was 
properly classified and should remain secret.”  120 CONG. REC. 6811 (1974), reprinted in 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-502) SOURCE 
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 257 (Jt. Comm. Print 
1975) [hereinafter Source Book]. 
 23. Federal judges are appointed for life and thus not subject to political pressures.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).  
Also, a judge, unlike an agency official, does not have a bureaucratic interest in protecting his 
decision. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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economy.  It takes much less time and effort for courts to review agency 
decisions under FOIA by simply conducting a superficial review of 
agency affidavits submitted in support of their decision.  However, 
review in this manner is not sufficient.  Effective review requires that 
courts take the time to look beyond the reasons stated by the agency to 
determine if they are bona fide and sufficient to qualify for exemption 
under FOIA.26  As Judge Patricia Wald stated, effective review according to 
the statutory command of Congress involves “insisting on affidavits 
setting out the security concerns, looking at the documentary material in 
camera if necessary, transmitting to the security agencies, most of whom 
do not like the FOIA one whit, the message that they are being held to 
account.”27
c.  Hostility of Judges Toward FOIA 
Another reason may be that the courts favor the policy of national 
security over that of open government. Under this theory, courts are 
reluctant to question the agency assertions that release of certain 
information would threaten national security.  Some judges have been 
very open with their distaste for FOIA.  In a 1982 article, then D.C. Circuit 
Court Judge Antonin Scalia called FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine 
of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Ignored.”28  Perhaps this is a sentiment that is widely felt, but 
generally left unspoken.  If this is the case, it is not likely to change in a 
post-September 11 environment.29
In assigning the authority of courts to review agency decisions under 
FOIA, Congress did not leave it to courts to balance the competing 
policies embodied in FOIA and its exceptions.  In creating FOIA, 
Congress made known their view that government secrecy, and 
dependent functionality, was worth sacrificing to some extent to enable 
the public to monitor its government.  Congress indicated that in limited 
circumstances government secrecy should be maintained, but these 
 26. See Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 753, 760 (1988) (“The Act specifically requires courts to assure themselves de novo 
that the material withheld by the government under a national security excuse is 
legitimately classified.”). 
 27. Id. at 761. 
 28. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG. 
Mar./Apr., at 14, 15 (1982). 
 29. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2.c, III.C. 




circumstances are restricted to the specific categories of information 
included in the exemptions.  As stated in A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. 
FTC, “Congress established . . . a general, firm philosophy of full agency 
disclosure, and provided de novo review by federal courts so that 
citizens and the press could obtain agency information wrongfully 
withheld.”30  Therefore, in FOIA litigation, courts are not asked to weigh 
competing policies because Congress has already done so. 
2.  Arguments Against Judicial Deference in the FOIA Context 
a.  Intent of Congress 
The deference that courts extend is contrary to the intent of Congress.  
In the Senate Report that accompanied the enactment of FOIA in 1966, 
de novo review is described as essential to prevent courts reviewing 
agency actions from instituting “meaningless judicial sanctioning of 
agency discretion.”31  Congress did not trust agencies to voluntarily 
comply with FOIA in all cases and gave the judiciary authority to 
monitor their compliance. 
The de novo review requirement of FOIA is consistent with the idea 
that Congress did not trust agencies to voluntarily comply with FOIA in 
every case.  Experience has shown that this distrust is often deserved.  
For example, in Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, the government withheld the 
Defense Department’s Defense Contract Audit Manual from a FOIA 
requester, claiming it was exempt.32  The requestor brought the case to 
court and eight years of litigation ensued as the government maintained 
its position.  It was not until faced with the possibility of a special master 
to review the requested material to determine if it was in fact exempt 
from FOIA that the government finally agreed to release the 
information.33  Even protracted litigation is not enough to force certain 
agencies to provide information that they have no right to withhold 
under FOIA.   
b.  The Importance of the Right Created by FOIA 
The affirmative right of access to government information is a 
particularly important right to the functioning of a democracy.34  Without 
this right, the public would only have access to the information which the 
 30. A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 31. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8 (1965). 
 32. Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 33. Id. at 1365. 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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government chose to release.  The government would be unaccountable 
for waste and abuse that harms the public, because the public would have 
no access to first-hand knowledge of it.  FOIA was enacted in recognition 
of this right.35
The Supreme Court has not found a right of access to particular 
government information implicit in the freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press guarantees of the First Amendment.36  However, 
some argue that the Court should acknowledge such a right.37  These 
arguments are based on the notion that the same policy of promoting 
transparency in government to allow citizens to make informed decisions 
that is behind FOIA is also in part behind the rights granted to 
individuals by the First Amendment.38  For example, just as providing 
access to criminal trials gives the public an invaluable and irreplaceable 
opportunity to monitor its government, so too does allowing access to 
information about the detention of individuals in terrorist investigations.  
FOIA is Congress’s way of providing access to government information 
while avoiding the constitutional implications. 
 35. While FOIA was enacted in 1966, it did not become a powerful means of 
access to government information until it was amended in 1974.  These amendments 
were enacted at a time when trust in government was very low, and deservedly so. 
President Nixon was forced to resign in the wake of Watergate and public anger over the 
Vietnam War was at its peak.  As stated by then Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia, “[the 1974 
amendments] can in fact only be understood as the product of the extraordinary era that 
produced them—when ‘public interest law,’ ‘consumerism,’ and ‘investigative 
journalism’ were at their zenith, public trust in the government at its nadir, and the 
executive branch and Congress functioning more like two separate governments than two 
branches of the same.”  Scalia, supra note 28, at 15. 
 36. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974) (holding that the Constitution 
does not impose upon the government the affirmative duty to make available to 
journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally); see 
also Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (same); cf. Potter Stewart, Or of 
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (“The Constitution itself is neither a 
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”). 
 37. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to 
Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1976) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should recognize that the right to know already held to 
be in the First Amendment includes the affirmative right of access to government 
information, and that recognition of a constitutional right would allow further 
development of that right, and most importantly, it would close gaps left by the statute). 
 38. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). 




c.  Hostility of the Executive Towards FOIA 
Another reason that courts should conduct a thorough review of 
agency decisions under FOIA is the hostility towards FOIA and its 
principles that the executive branch often exhibits.  This hostility has 
existed ever since the act was first conceived.39  The Ford Administration 
strongly opposed the enactment of the 1974 FOIA Amendments,40 and the 
executive branch remains averse to open government today.41  In 2001, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum stating that any 
decision to withhold information that has a “sound legal basis” and does 
not “present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact” on the work of other 
agencies will be defended by the Department of Justice.42  This replaced 
the prodisclosure “foreseeable harm” standard established by Attorney 
 39. FOIA was passed despite strong protest from the executive branch, led by the 
Department of Justice, which argued that the costs to the public of enacting FOIA greatly 
outweighed any public benefit that would be produced.  JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 FEDERAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW 2-8, 2-9 (1990).  For 
more information on specific agency objections, see Comments on Proposed 
Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of 
Information Bill, 40 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 417, 418 n.6 (1965) and Blanchard, A History 
of the Federal Records Law, U. MO. FREEDOM OF INFO. CENT. REP. NO. 189 (1967), cited 
in O’REILLY, supra. 
 40. President Ford vetoed the bill containing the 1974 Amendments stating that 
they gave too much power to the courts to review agency decisions under FOIA.  
President Ford told the House of Representatives that “[a] determination by the Secretary 
of Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger our national security would, 
even though reasonable, have to be overturned by a district judge who thought the 
plaintiff’s position just as reasonable.”  Source Book, supra note 22, at 483-85. 
 41. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz wrote a memorandum stating: 
It is clear that . . . the security of information critical to the national security will 
remain at risk for an indefinite period.   
 It is therefore vital that the Defense Department employees, as well as 
persons in other organizations that support DOD, exercise great caution in 
discussing information related to DOD work, regardless of their duties. . . .  
Classified information may be discussed only in authorized spaces and with 
persons having a specific need to know and the proper security clearance.  
Unclassified information may likewise require protection because it can often be 
compiled to reveal sensitive conclusions.  Much of the information we use to 
conduct DOD’s operations must be withheld from public release because of its 
sensitivity.  If in doubt, do not release or discuss official information except 
with other DoD personnel. 
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Memorandum for Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts 
(Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/10/wolfowitz.html. 
 42. John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Memorandum for Heads of All Fed. 
Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft 
Memorandum].  The memorandum also encourages all federal agencies to consider not 
just the values embodied in FOIA, but the protection of values and interests such as 
national security, the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and personal privacy 
as well.  Id. 
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General Janet Reno under President Clinton.43  This new standard is a 
clear shift towards a policy of nondisclosure by the Bush Administration.  
The importance of judicial review of agency decisions in ensuring that 
FOIA fulfills its purpose is magnified where the policy of the Executive 
is contrary to this purpose. 
III.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A.  Law Versus Fact Distinction 
The determination of whether certain information is included under an 
exemption of FOIA can be viewed as a three part analysis involving 
questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact.  
First, the language of the exemption must be interpreted to determine 
what is meant to be excluded.  For example, under Exemption 4—which 
exempts from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”44—a 
question arises as to what is a “trade secret.”  These words must be 
interpreted before the exemption can be properly applied.  Second, facts 
about the nature of the information sought must be gathered.  Again 
using the case of Exemption 4, it must be determined whether the 
information sought is secret, whether it is commercially valuable, 
whether it can be used for the production of any product, among other 
things.  Finally, the interpreted law must be applied to the gathered facts 
and a conclusion made as to whether the exemption applies. 
In general, when reviewing administrative agency decisions, courts 
give more deference to agencies’ factual determinations than to 
agencies’ legal determinations.45  In the case of legal determinations, the 
 43. Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Memorandum For Heads of Dep’ts 
and Agencies Re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993), http://usdoj.gov/oip/ 
foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm.  Exemptions would be defended by the Department 
of Justice only where “the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful 
to an interest protected by that exemption.”  Id.  Further, even where an item might 
arguably fall within an exemption, “it ought not to be withheld . . . unless it need be.”  Id. 
 44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000). 
 45. A major exception to this general rule is Chevron deference.  In Chevron 
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, the Supreme Court held that courts must defer 
to the agency interpretations of statutes where Congress clearly left the interpretation 
power to the agency either explicitly or implicitly by use of broad language.  467 U.S. 
837, 842-44 (1984).  “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 




courts have both the constitutional authority and the expertise to make 
such determinations.46  On the other hand, the agencies are considered to 
have expertise in factfinding in their particular field.47
In the case of FOIA, Congress specifically overrode the principle of 
deferring to agencies’ factual determinations by requiring de novo 
review.  Agency findings are rarely subject to such thorough review.48  
Use of the less stringent standards “ensure that administrative responsibility 
rests with those whose experience is daily and continual, not with judges 
whose exposure is episodic and occasional.”49  A comparison of the 
circumstances under which the less thorough forms of review are 
required to the circumstances of FOIA cases illustrates the need for de 
novo review of agency decisions to withhold information under FOIA. 
B.  Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
The arbitrary and capricious test is supposed to be the narrowest50 
standard of review defined by Congress.51  In an abstract sense, it is 
equivalent to a “pass/fail” standard.52  However, in application, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard is difficult to distinguish from the 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id.  Where the 
legislative delegation to the agency is implicit, “a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”  Id. at 843-44.  Regarding the issue of judicial review under 
FOIA, Congress used specific language designating de novo review as the appropriate 
standard, thus Chevron deference does not apply. 
 46. “It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say 
what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Another 
reason is one of economy.  In the case of a legal determination, one court decision can 
clear up the issue and provide precedent for similar cases in the future.  In contrast, 
questions of fact are more particular in nature and thus vary from case to case.  It would 
be a substantial burden for courts to retry every case already tried by an agency, and thus 
deference is said to be warranted.  ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 446 (2d ed. 2001). 
 47. This expertise is a product of the designation of the agency for the fulfillment 
of a specific regulatory function and the substantial experience the agency typically has 
in carrying out that function. 
 48. FOIA decisions are the most cited examples.  “Trial de novo is available when 
a court reviews an agency’s denial of a FOIA request, but is otherwise rare.”  Blackletter 
Statement, supra note 15. 
 49. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 50. “Narrow” here refers to the scope of review.  The narrower the scope of 
review, the less scrutiny the court is to apply to the prior decision, and the higher the 
approval rate of prior decisions is expected to be. 
 51. Verkuil, supra note 18, at 687-88.  The four standards listed in order from 
narrowest to widest scope are: arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, clearly 
erroneous, and de novo.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 688. 
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substantial evidence standard.53  Reasonableness is the main consideration 
in the application of both.54  As stated by the Supreme Court in Bowman 
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard an agency’s decision should be 
evaluated to determine if there is a “‘rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’”55  Most courts are inclined to use this 
test.56
Arbitrary and capricious is the default standard used in judicial review 
of agency actions.57  It is typically applied in cases involving informal 
adjudications and informal agency rulemaking.58  Adjudication or rulemaking 
is considered “informal” where the agency is not required by statute to 
provide the various procedures and safeguards that are required in formal 
adjudications and formal rulemaking procedures.59  Decisions in these 
cases are not based on detailed factual records as they are with formal 
adjudications.  In the case of informal adjudications, no formal record is 
created, but the administrative record is said to consist of “a file of 
materials that the agency maintains as the exclusive basis for its 
 53. According to the opinion in Overton Park, the arbitrary or capricious test is 
similar to the clearly erroneous test used in civil litigation. That opinion reads: 
Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”  To make this finding, the court must consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been 
a clear error of judgment. 
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations 
omitted).  This view has been widely rejected, and the standard applied in practice is 
nearly identical to the substantial evidence standard.  See Blackletter Statement, supra 
note 15 (“In any other case [that is, other than review of formal proceedings, which use 
the substantial evidence test, and cases involving de novo review] the court determines 
whether the factual premise has substantial support in the administrative record viewed 
as a whole (although the legal standard nominally being applied is the arbitrary and 
capricious test).”) (emphasis added). 
 54. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 684 
(D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 55. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 
(1974) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 56. See Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032, 1037 (10th Cir. 
1995); Hopi Tribe v. Navajo Tribe, 46 F.3d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1995); Metro. Council of 
NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). 
 58. Section 706(2) prescribes de novo review for cases subject to it, and substantial 
evidence review in cases subject to sections 556 and 557.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  It reserves 
the arbitrary and capricious standard for all other cases.  The other types of cases left are 
informal rulemaking and adjudications.  Id. 
 59. Blackletter Statement, supra note 15, at 29. 




decision; or, if no such file is maintained, it consists of all unprivileged 
materials that were actively considered by the agency or its staff . . . in 
connection with the action under review.”60
The advantage provided by use of informal adjudication is efficiency.  
It avoids the time consuming process of the judicial model and it puts the 
resolution of the issue under the control of experts. 
It may seem intuitive that a stricter standard of review should be 
applied where the agency has more discretion and acts free from the 
procedures and safeguards required in other settings.  But applying a 
more stringent standard of review would effectively shift adjudicatory 
power back into the hands of the judiciary and subject all parties 
involved to the time consuming processes that informal adjudications 
and rulemakings are designed to avoid.  Thus, less judicial scrutiny is 
required by Congress in such cases—the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is used—in order to preserve the efficiency that is the 
advantage of informal adjudication and rulemaking. 
The drawbacks to informal agency proceedings in comparison with 
their formal counterparts are that the individual or business is put at a 
major disadvantage to the agency, the parties outside the agency have 
significantly less input in the process, and fairness is sacrificed in the 
interest of efficiency and flexibility for the agency.  Congress decided 
that in cases where informal adjudication is available, this sacrifice was 
an appropriate policy choice.  In the case of FOIA, however, Congress 
has rejected the idea of sacrificing the interests embodied in FOIA for 
the interest of efficiency.  Requiring de novo review puts full 
adjudicatory power into the hands of the judiciary in any case of an 
agency’s denial of access to information under FOIA that is brought to 
federal court. 
C.  Substantial Evidence Review 
The substantial evidence review standard is traditionally applied in 
cases reviewing formal agency decisions.61  Substantial evidence review 
requires that the agency’s decision be supported by something “more 
than a mere scintilla” of evidence.62  Courts must use a reasonableness 
test: If a reasonable person could make the same decisions as the agency 
based on the evidence in the record, then the decision should be 
 60. Id. at 41. 
 61. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 768 (4th 
ed. 2002).  See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 62. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).  Note that this 
statement is almost always accompanied in opinions by a statement describing the test as 
a reasonableness test. 
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affirmed.63  In making this determination, courts must examine the entire 
agency record, taking into consideration evidence on both sides of the 
issue.64
Under the substantial evidence test, the court is bound by the agency’s 
decision unless that decision is found to be unreasonable, and thus fails 
the test.65  This test suggests that in the context in which the standard is 
applied, agency decision making is the superior, but not perfect, 
mechanism for resolving the issue.  If it were perfect, then no judicial 
review would be necessary.  If it were not superior, then de novo review 
would be necessary. 
The substantial evidence standard is applied in cases reviewing agency 
conclusions made through formal trial-type procedures.66  These involve 
review by an administrative law judge of agency action carried out under 
statutory law that is specifically applicable to that agency.67  As stated in 
Aman and Mayton’s Treatise on Administrative Law: 
The substantial evidence standard applies to facts in such proceedings that are 
based on a record compiled before an unbiased judge after an evidentiary 
hearing.  The facts involved tend to be retrospective in nature and are best 
resolved by adducing the kind of evidence designed to prove who did what, when, 
where and how.68
The nature of the issues dealt with in these formal adjudications varies 
widely from case to case, and thus comparison of one kind of such 
adjudication with agency decisions under FOIA is not helpful.  But 
comparison on a general level brings certain significant distinctions to 
 63. Id. 
 64. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488 (“The substantiality of evidence 
must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”). 
 65. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.3 (2d 
ed. 1997) (“Reasonableness review . . . binds the court to the agency’s conclusion unless 
the court finds the conclusion to be unreasonable.”). 
 66. “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000).  The APA 
provides for reasonableness review, the substantial evidence standard, where 
administrative decisions must be made through the trial-type procedures of sections 556 
and 557.  KOCH, supra note 65, § 10.3. 
 67. Sections 554 through 556 cover the procedure for administrative agency 
adjudications.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-556 (2000).  Section 554(a) states that the section 
applies to adjudications required by statute to be determined on the record after an 
opportunity for an agency hearing.  5 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
 68. AMAN, JR. & MAYTON, supra note 46, § 13.5. 




light. First, FOIA decisions at the agency level are not trial-type 
proceedings.  An agency can simply deny a person’s FOIA request.  The 
requester is then entitled to a written appeal to the head of the agency, 
but the agency has the power again to simply deny the request.69  Thus, a 
formal record is not created at the agency level in FOIA cases.  The 
agency has engaged in factfinding only to the extent that it has—at least 
ostensibly—searched for and found the information requested, considered 
possible consequences of its release, and decided that it is exempted 
from FOIA.  These “factual determinations” are passed on to the court in 
FOIA litigation through pleadings and affidavits submitted by agency 
officials.  The nature of the factfinding that occurs in FOIA cases is thus 
different from the factfinding that occurs in formal adjudications in that 
it is not conducted under an impartial administrative law judge, it is not 
extensive, it is not adversarial, and it is not formally recorded.  It is 
before the court that a FOIA litigant first has the opportunity to present 
his or her case in a trial-like setting.  Requiring de novo review thus 
allows the plaintiff a chance to have a full and fair trial unavailable at the 
agency level. 
IV.  JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CASES INVOLVING EXEMPTIONS                               
1, 3, AND 7(A) OF FOIA 
This section examines the type of review that courts actually conduct 
in cases involving Exemptions 1, 3, and 7(A).  Agencies deny FOIA 
requests based on national security reasons most often under Exemption 
1, and courts regularly defer to agency judgment despite a congressional 
mandate to the contrary.  Deference to agency decisions seems 
appropriate in cases involving Exemption 3, and subsection B argues 
that some deference should be granted.  Finally, the courts have 
erroneously extended the application of deference in cases involving 
Exemptions 1 and 3 to cases involving Exemption 7(A). 
A.  Exemption 1 
In the interest of promoting national security, agencies are given the 
power to classify certain information as secret and thus withhold it from 
the public.70  The first exemption to FOIA exempts information that has 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), (ii) (2000). 
 70. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).  The agency’s 
decision to withhold the information under FOIA’s Exemption 1 is reviewed under the 
Executive order used to make the classification decision, regardless of any Executive 
order that is arguably more applicable.  Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 289 (1999) (citing 
Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Diamond v. FBI, 
707 F.2d 75, 78 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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been properly classified pursuant to an Executive order.71  Information 
can be classified before or after a FOIA request is made.  In reviewing 
an agency’s decision to withhold information under this exemption, the 
main issue that courts address is whether the information is properly 
classified under the Executive order.72
FOIA does not indicate that any deference should be granted to the 
agency’s decision to withhold information under Exemption 1.  It states 
that agency decisions should be reviewed de novo73 and that the agency 
has the burden of proof for showing that the information falls under the 
exemption.74  Despite this language, in cases brought before federal 
courts following the enactment of FOIA, courts deferred to agency 
judgments regarding classification of information.75  In EPA v. Mink, the 
Supreme Court held that a court’s only role in reviewing denials of 
FOIA requests under Exemption 1 was to determine if the information 
had in fact been classified according to an Executive order by the 
agency.76  It held that courts were not to examine the propriety of the 
classification and that in camera inspection allowing courts to examine 
 71. “This section does not apply to matters that are . . . (A) specifically authorized 
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such 
Executive order . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
 72. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 22 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 73. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 74. Id. 
 75. The judicial inquiry is limited to the question whether an appropriate 
executive order has been made as to the material in question. . . .  [This] simply 
recognizes the proposition that the question of what is desirable in the interest 
of national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of question that courts are 
designed to deal with.  As has been stated, the judiciary has neither the 
“aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility” to review these essentially political 
decisions. 
Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 
81-84 (1973) (holding that the language and the legislative history of FOIA show that 
Congress did not intend FOIA to “subject executive security classifications to judicial 
review at the insistence of anyone who might seek to question them”); Soucie v. David, 
448 F.2d 1067, 1079 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (acknowledging that other exemptions require 
de novo review, but stating that review of Exemption 1 decisions are “limited to 
determining that the administrative decision was not arbitrary and capricious”). 
 76. Mink, 410 U.S. at 84. 




the information was not permitted.77  However, Congress disagreed, and 
that holding was overruled the following year by amendments to FOIA.78
The 1974 Amendments to FOIA included changes designed to clarify 
the role of courts in FOIA litigation and stop the rubberstamping of 
agency decisions.79  In addition to reiterating that courts should review 
agency decisions de novo, the amendments authorized courts to review 
requested information in camera as part of their de novo review.80  This 
allowed courts to be less dependent on agency affidavits in examining 
the propriety of the classification of the information.81
Despite these efforts by Congress to guide courts towards de novo 
review, courts remain overly deferential to agency expertise regarding 
the classification of information. The typical approach taken by courts is 
to grant summary judgment to the agency where 
(1) the agency affidavits describe the documents withheld and the justifications 
for nondisclosure in enough detail and with sufficient specificity to demonstrate 
that material withheld is logically within the domain of the exemption claimed, 
and (2) the affidavits are neither controverted by contrary record evidence nor 
impugned by bad faith on the part of the agency.82
Emphasis is placed on the agency affidavits, and in camera review is 
generally avoided.83
Courts cite a report from a House-Senate conference committee as the 
authority supporting deference to agencies.84  The report states that 
“substantial weight” should be accorded to an agency’s affidavit 
“concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.”85 
Courts place much less emphasis or completely ignore other statements 
made in that same report as well as statements made in other contexts 
 77. Id. 
 78. Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 
Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).   
 79. A complete description of all the changes included in the amendments can be 
found in Source Book, supra note 22, at 122. 
 80. Id. at 127. 
 81. Without in camera review, the only information about the character of the 
information being withheld is provided by the government agency in affidavits submitted 
in support of their decisions to withhold the information.  Also, in camera review allows 
a court to “separate the secret from the supposedly nonsecret and order disclosure of the 
latter.”  Mink, 410 U.S. at 84 (holding that in camera review was not authorized for this 
purpose), superseded by Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).   
 82. King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted); see also Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Bell v. 
United States, 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1977) and King, 830 F.2d at 217). 
 83. See, e.g., Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 84. See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 229 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in Source Book, 
supra note 22, at 229. 
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that also comprise the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments.  For 
example, a Senate report states that a court’s inquiry should “review not 
only . . . the superficial evidence—a ‘Secret’ stamp on a document or set 
of records—but also . . . the inherent justification for the use of such a 
stamp.”86  A House report states that a court “may look at the 
reasonableness or propriety of the determination to classify the records 
under the terms of the Executive order.”87
It seems clear, at least according to the conference committee report, 
that Congress intended courts to take notice of, and grant substantial 
weight to, agency affidavits in their review of agency decisions under 
Exemption 1.  However, it is also clear that the role that Congress 
intended for courts involves more than merely approving classifications 
that appear logical.  The de novo review requirement, in camera review 
authorization, and the requirements of the FOIA Amendments make 
clear that Congress intended a different level of deference than the one 
currently in use.88
B.  Exemption 3 and the National Security Act 
Exemption 3 of FOIA allows courts to withhold information that is: 
[S]pecifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute 
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to 
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for 
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.89
Agencies usually use the National Security Act of 194790 as the 
qualifying statute when invoking this exemption to withhold information 
for national security reasons.91  In such cases, agencies often argue that 
 86. Id. at 182. 
 87. Id. at 127. 
 88. This was the level of deference applied in Mink that was expressly overruled 
by the 1974 Amendments.  See Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)), and supra text 
accompanying note 78. 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
 90. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-442 (2000). 
 91. See, e.g., Weiner v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 983 (9th Cir. 1991) (invoking provisions 
of the National Security Act to qualify for FOIA’s Exemption 3).  The CIA Act of 1949 is 
also sometimes invoked.  It states, “In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence 
activities . . . the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of . . . any other law which 
require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, 
salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency . . . .”  50 U.S.C. § 403g. 




disclosure of the requested information will compromise intelligence 
sources and methods.92
FOIA does not indicate that Exemption 3 is to be treated any 
differently than the other eight exemptions.  However, some courts have 
granted a higher level of deference under this exemption.  In his 
concurring opinion in EPA v. Mink, Justice Stewart stated that “the only 
‘matter’ to be determined in a district court’s de novo inquiry is the factual 
existence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or 
inadvertent the enactment might be.”93  Justice Stewart compared Exemptions 
1 and 3 and concluded that they were equally rigid. 
The deferential treatment that the Court gave withholding under 
Exemption 1 in Mink was overruled by Congress.94  However, some 
courts continued to treat withholding under Exemption 3 with the same 
unwarranted level of deference.95 The current treatment of agency 
decisions to withhold information under Exemption 3 and the National 
Security Act is somewhat less deferential than that exhibited in Mink and 
is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s treatment in CIA v. Sims.96  In 
Sims, the court deferred to the decision of the CIA Director to withhold 
superficially innocuous information because he believed it could enable 
an observer to discover intelligence sources.97  The Court stated that 
“[t]he decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with ‘the 
whole picture,’ as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the 
magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at 
stake.”98  The court went on to hold that because the Director’s decision 
was reasonable, summary judgment for the CIA should be affirmed.99
This approach is not de novo review.  It is a reasonableness review 
that is not readily distinguishable from the standards of review employed 
 92. See, e.g., CIA v. Hunt, 981 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 93. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 95 n.* (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring), overruled on 
other grounds by Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 
88 Stat. 1561 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).  
 94. 88 Stat. at 1561. 
 95. Knight v. U.S. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the CIA’s 
determination to withhold information under the National Security Act and Exemption 3 
is unreviewable absent a showing of bad faith); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for CIA) (“Exemption 3 differs from other 
FOIA exemptions in that its applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of 
specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and 
the inclusion of withheld material within that statute’s coverage.”). 
 96. 471 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). 
 97. Id. at 178-79 (citing Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
and Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
 98. Id. at 179. 
 99. Id. at 179-80. 
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in judicial review of other types of agency decisions.100  However, it is in 
the case of Exemption 3, more than with Exemptions 1 and 7(A), that a 
case for a high degree of deference to agency decisions can best be 
made.  In the case of Exemption 3, Congress has already granted the 
Director of the CIA discretion to determine what information should be 
withheld to protect informational sources and methods.  This is 
comparable to Chevron deference, whereby courts grant deference to  
agency determinations of questions of law that arise out of the 
interpretation of statutes geared specifically towards that agency.101
While Congress did not indicate any intent to create a different 
standard of review for agency denials of information under Exemption 3, 
a different standard seems appropriate.  A major justification for de novo 
review of FOIA cases is that no agency has expertise in FOIA, and thus 
courts should maintain substantial adjudicatory control over FOIA cases.  
However, with Exemption 3, the agency does not need to interpret and 
apply FOIA directly, but rather a statute that applies specifically to that 
agency or its field of expertise.  In such cases, a reasonableness standard 
is sufficient to limit agency discretion while allowing for the advantages 
of agency expertise. 
C.  Exemption 7(A) 
Exemption 7(A) of FOIA states that section (a) of FOIA does not 
apply to records or information compiled for law enforcement if the 
production of such could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings.102  The purpose of this exemption, as stated in 
congressional reports, is to “prevent harm to the Government’s case in 
court by not allowing an opposing litigant earlier or greater access to 
investigative files than he would otherwise have.”103
In Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of 
Justice, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the agency’s assertion that release of 
the information would interfere with government investigations.104  Prior 
to this case, various circuits and the D.C. Circuit had rejected the idea of 
extending the deference applied to Exemption 1 and Exemption 3 cases 
 100. That is, the “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standards 
discussed above which both essentially equate to a reasonableness standard. 
 101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 102. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000). 
 103. Source Book, supra note 22, at 332 (statement of Senator Hart). 
 104. 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 




to cases involving Exemption 7(A).105  In this case, plaintiffs sought 
information regarding those detained in the investigations following the 
attacks of September 11.106  The information sought included the names 
of the detainees, location and times of their arrests, detention and release, 
and the names of their attorneys.107 In their request, plaintiffs cited 
reports about the mistreatment of detainees, and noted that many 
detainees were held for several days without any formal charges being 
filed.108  The Department of Justice asserted that release of the information 
would interfere with investigations by allowing witness intimidation and 
by revealing the scope of the investigations.  The District Court rejected 
these assertions as tenuous and vague.  The appellate court reversed, 
holding that “the government’s declarations, viewed in light of the 
appropriate deference to the executive on issues of national security, 
satisfy this burden.”109
This is the first case involving the invocation of Exemption 7(A) to 
withhold information for “national security” reasons.  Exemption 7(A) is 
typically invoked in cases where the government wishes to withhold the 
 105. See, e.g., Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1221 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying request for 
information for FBI records detailing procurement and circulation of surveillance 
equipment).  The Ferri court held that in light of a mandate that courts make de novo 
review and that the agency has the burden of proving that an exemption applies, courts 
generally should not pay special deference to the agency’s findings.  Id.  Drafters 
expressly state when such deference is proper in the FOIA context, as in the case of 
Exemption 1.  Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 315 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (“[W]e have not found it appropriate to extend any special deference beyond the 
Exemption 1 context.”). 
 106. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 921-22.  The plaintiffs in this case 
included: 
the Center for National Security Studies, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, American Immigration Law Foundation, American Immigration 
Lawyers Association, Amnesty International USA, Arab-American Institute, 
Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Center for Constitutional 
Rights, Center for Democracy and Technology, Council on American Islamic 
Relations, First Amendment Foundation, Human Rights Watch, Multiracial 
Activist, Nation Magazine, National Association for Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, National Black Police Association, Inc., Partnership for Civil Justice, 
Inc., People for the American Way Foundation, Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, and the World Organization Against Torture USA. 
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 n.1 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 107. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 918. 
 108. Id. at 922; see also Wayne Parry, Many Arrested but Few Are Charged in 
Government’s Roundup, Augusta Chronicle, Sept. 11, 2002, available at 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/091102/sep_124-4147.shtml. 
 109. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926.  The court went on to state, “It is 
not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in 
furtherance of that branch’s proper role.  The judgment of the district court ordering the 
government to disclose the names of the detainees is reversed.”  Id. at 932. 
SLEGERS.DOC 4/20/2006  9:20 AM 
[VOL. 43:  209, 2006]  The Case Against Judicial Deference 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 231 
 
information for fear that releasing it could give unfair advantage in court 
to the requester.110  The implementation of the domestic “war on terror” 
has to some extent caused a merging of the functions of law enforcement 
and protection of national security.  However, the terms should not be 
viewed as synonymous in statutory interpretation because of recent 
events.  Congress did not intend that Exemption 7(A) should cover 
information withheld for national security reasons. 
In the case of Exemption 1, Congress indicated its intent that courts 
give some deference to agency affidavits.111  Exemption 7(A) comes 
with no indication that any deference should be granted to agency 
decisions.  For a court to grant deference in this case is to add a “national 
security” element to Exemption 7(A) that Congress did not enact. 
The terrorist investigations following September 11 obviously have 
national security implications, but this does not change the text or the 
purpose of Exemption 7(A).  The issue that courts are to examine de 
novo in such cases is still whether the release of the information will 
interfere with law enforcement proceedings.  Also, the policy reasons for 
requiring de novo review in FOIA cases, which are discussed in Part II 
of this Comment,112 including the importance of the right created by 
FOIA, the ability of judges to make FOIA determinations, and the 
hostility of the executive branch towards FOIA, apply in this case as 
well. 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where access to government 
information could be more important to the public’s ability to effectively 
monitor its government.  The information requested would allow 
plaintiffs to examine the treatment of detainees and the motivation 
behind their detention.113  Dangerous consequences can result from a 
court’s willingness to defer to agency decisions in this context.114  FOIA 
 110. The Exemption’s stated purpose is to prevent this.  See Source Book, supra 
note 22, at 332, and text accompanying note 103. 
 111. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 229 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in Source 
Book, supra note 22, at 229. 
 112. See supra Part II.  The policy reasons include the importance of the rights 
created by FOIA, the ability of judges to make FOIA determinations, and the hostility of 
the Executive towards FOIA. 
 113. This is especially important where, as in this case, the government also has 
denied the public access to the deportation hearings of many arrested during these same 
investigations.  See generally N. Jersey. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 114. It is interesting that in Center for National Security Studies, Judge Sentelle 
wrote, “In upholding the government’s invocation of Exemption 7(A), we observe that 




can be a powerful weapon against government excesses in these cases if 
it is allowed to function properly.  However, until courts are willing to 
conduct thorough review of FOIA decisions, its power will be 
undermined. 
V.  SUGGESTED CHANGES: AVAILABLE TOOLS FOR DE NOVO REVIEW 
Courts have not only failed to thoroughly review agency decisions, 
they have blocked the use of the powerful tools they are authorized and 
encouraged by Congress to use in order to accomplish de novo review.  
In camera inspection allows courts to examine the information that has 
been requested so that they can make independent determinations of 
what harm might result if the information were released, or at least to 
verify that the harms predicted by the agency are likely to occur.115  
Congress has allowed courts discretion in deciding whether to conduct in 
camera review of the information.116  If the court does not review the 
information in camera, then only the agency has first-hand knowledge of 
the specific nature of the information.  To some extent, this forces the 
court to defer to the agency’s affidavits because they have little else on 
which to base their decision. 
Despite the utility of in camera review, courts can be reluctant to use it 
in FOIA cases.117  Courts have held that if an agency’s affidavits pass the 
test created in King and reiterated in Halperin, then in camera review 
may be inappropriate and summary judgment may be granted because 
we are in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the executive’s 
judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism.”  331 F.3d at 932; see also 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (dismissing the habeas corpus 
petition of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan challenging his military detention and 
designation as an enemy combatant); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 
748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding against constitutional challenge a portion of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (Supp. I 2001), which authorizes ex parte use 
of classified evidence in proceedings to freeze the assets of terrorist organizations); N. 
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220 (holding that closure of “special interest” 
deportation hearings involving INS detainees with alleged connections to terrorism does 
not violate the First Amendment); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing district court’s order that allowed alleged enemy combatant unmonitored 
access to counsel).  The Supreme Court reversed the two Fourth Circuit cases, and in 
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held 
contrary to the Third Circuit. 
 115. This is accomplished by the court viewing the actual information that has been 
withheld. 
 116. The statute states that courts may use in camera review.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) 
(2000). 
 117. Ingle v. Dep’t of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that in 
camera examination is to be the exception, not the rule). 
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substantial weight is to be accorded to the affidavit.118  This approach 
relieves the court of the substantial burden that would come with having 
to review in detail agency claims of exemption, and it leaves the decision 
of whether releasing the information could potentially harm national 
security to an agency specifically assigned the task of protecting national 
security.  However, this approach is not de novo.  At best, it is comparable 
to the reasonableness tests that courts use in reviewing other types of 
agency decisions.119
Congress has rejected this type of judicial review in the FOIA context.  
The court in Ray v. Turner summarized Congress’s rejection in stating: 
The legislative history underscores that the intent of Congress regarding de novo 
review stood in contrast to, and was a rejection of, the alternative suggestion 
proposed by the Administration and supported by some Senators: that in the 
national security context the court should be limited to determining whether 
there was a reasonable basis for the decision by the appropriate official to 
withhold the document.120
One reason courts might seek to avoid in camera review is that the 
requested information is often voluminous, and conducting in camera 
review would be burdensome, if not impractical. A solution to this 
problem would be review of a sample of the requested information.  This 
problem was addressed to some extent in Vaughn v. Rosen where the 
court established that the agency must provide a detailed description of 
the information being withheld as well as a detailed explanation of the 
 118. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 22-23 
(D.D.C. 2000) (citing Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 276 F.3d 634 (D.C. Cir. 2002); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 
210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 
1981).  The King test states that where agency affidavits are reasonably specific in 
describing the withheld information, the reasons stated for withholding the information 
establish a logical connection between the information and the claimed exemption, and 
the affidavits are not controverted by contrary evidence or evidence of bad faith, 
summary judgment is proper.  King, 830 F.2d at 217.   
 119. That is, the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and capricious test, 
which are in practice both reasonableness tests. 
 120. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  The court went on to 
state:  
In proposing a “reasonable basis” standard, the Administration and supporting 
legislators argued that de novo responsibility and in camera inspection could 
not properly be assigned to judges, in part because of logistical problems, and 
in part because of their lack of relevant experience and meaningful 
appreciation of the implications of the material involved. 
Id. 




reasons for withholding the information.121  The stated purposes of 
requiring these “Vaughn indexes” are to “assure that a party’s right to 
information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and 
mischaracterization, and [to] permit the court system effectively and 
efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed information.”122  
This requirement allows courts to conduct a type of review that is closer 
to de novo than review based only on agency pleadings.  At least in this 
way the court and the plaintiff have a relatively detailed idea about the 
nature of the information being withheld.  However, the limitations of 
Vaughn indices leave judicial review far short of de novo.123 Most 
importantly, because the affidavits are prepared by the agency, the 
agency can provide descriptions that are favorable to the agency’s case.  
This is not a sufficient substitute for the court’s first-hand examination 
of the materials and judgment regarding the applicability of the 
exemption. Using these affidavits, the court’s review can be characterized as 
a sufficiency and reasonableness review of the affidavits,124 not as a de 
novo review of the agency’s decision to withhold information. 
Requiring courts to review a sample of the requested information 
creates similar problems.  The agency could turn over as a sample only 
the portions of the information that it wanted the court to see. For 
example, if a plaintiff requested information regarding a certain CIA 
program, the government might offer a sample that included the 
information most likely to cause harm to national security if released, 
while withholding the information least likely to do so in hopes that the 
court would grant summary judgment for the CIA regarding all the 
information.  A possible solution to this would be to take random 
samples of the entire record.  With a random sample it is possible that 
the court might get only portions of information that are exempted from 
FOIA while missing portions that are not.  However, the chances of this 
happening are minimal.  Further, a sample is likely to at least allow a 
court to root out cases of agency bad faith. 
Special masters are used in order to lighten the burden on courts that 
choose to examine the requested information in depth.  In Washington 
 121. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 122. Id. at 826. 
 123. For a thorough discussion of the limitations of the use of Vaughn affidavits, see 
Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National 
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67 (1992). 
 124. The Vaughn affidavit in Washington Post v. United States Department of 
Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1991), stated that releasing any of the information 
could “cause ‘exceptionally grave damage to national security.’” Deyling, supra note 
123, at 101.  It was later discovered that part of the information addressed the fact that 
milk should not be included in the lunchboxes of pilots who fly long flights because it 
could spoil.  Id. 
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Post v. United States Department of Defense, the judge chose to employ 
a special master to examine the information and present a report to the 
court.125  The special master did not give any opinions on whether the 
information should be disclosed, but merely summarized the information 
and provided a description of its nature for the court.126  The use of 
special masters was suggested by the court in Vaughn v. Rosen127 and is 
authorized by Congress.128
First-hand examination of the withheld information allows the court to 
conduct a true de novo review of the agency’s decision to withhold.  
Without first-hand examination, the court is only reviewing the agency’s 
decision through the perspective of the agency presented to the court in 
its pleadings and affidavits.  In camera review should thus be a required 
part of a court’s de novo review of agencies’ denials of access to 
information. 
Another means of bringing courts’ review of agency FOIA decisions 
closer to a de novo review is through the use of plaintiffs’ experts or 
court appointed independent experts. Use of such experts would allow 
the plaintiff a chance to counter agency claims of proper classification or 
potential harms from disclosure of the information.  Without use of such 
experts, the plaintiff can only submit his or her own ideas about why the 
information is not exempted, and these are easily countered by agency 
officials and quickly rejected by courts.129  The courts rely almost 
entirely on affidavits submitted by agencies, but then summarily reject 
affidavits submitted by plaintiffs.130
By deferring to agencies in this way, courts have removed the only 
barrier to excessive agency secrecy.131  If courts defy congressional 
 125. Wash. Post, 766 F. Supp. at 3. 
 126. Id. at 4. 
 127. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 828 (stating that special masters may be useful to assume 
the burden of examining the requested information); see also Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 
F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 128. Source Book, supra note 22, at 167, 247 (suggesting the possibility of a 
Freedom of Information Commission). 
 129. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 22-23 (D.D.C. 
2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 276 F.3d 634 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 130. See, e.g., Wash. Post, 766 F. Supp. at 6-7; Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1989); Gardels v. CIA, 689 
F.2d 1100, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 131. FOIA is the only federal law of its kind.  If it is not effectively enforced, then 
citizens are left without an affirmative right of access to government information.  If 
courts do not effectively enforce FOIA via thorough judicial review of agency decisions 
to withhold information, citizens have no recourse other than with the agency. 




mandate and do not thoroughly review agency decisions to withhold 
information, then agencies are beholden only to themselves and authorities 
within the executive branch.  Allowing agencies to determine the extent 
to which they can withhold information can have dangerous consequences.  If 
all that is required is for the government to submit an affidavit that 
contains a reasonably detailed description of the information requested 
and a rational link between the information and the exemption, an 
agency can withhold virtually any information it wants through creative 
descriptions.  By accepting this, courts are granting government agencies 
the trust that Congress refused to grant them.  This permits the 
government to operate in relative secrecy. 
It seems that Congress has provided ideas, but courts have resisted 
change because of resources and a traditional disposition against the 
aims of FOIA.  Perhaps now it is time for Congress to require courts to 
use the available tools to conduct more thorough review. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The most basic premise of FOIA is a  “policy strongly favoring public 
disclosure of information in the possession of federal agencies.”132  In 
keeping with this policy, FOIA exemptions should be “‘narrowly 
construed with doubts resolved in favor of disclosure.’”133  Furthermore, 
and perhaps most importantly, de novo review is required.134  It is 
through this review that federal agencies are supposed to be held 
accountable to the requirements of FOIA.  However, because courts have 
failed to conduct actual de novo review in FOIA cases involving national 
security concerns, this procedural safeguard has been disabled.  This 
treatment is not likely to improve in this post-September 11 environment.135  
Thus, it seems that new legislation is necessary to ensure that agency 
decisions under FOIA are effectively reviewed.  There is no question 
that FOIA is worth protecting.136
FOIA already states that courts are to review agency decisions de 
novo, but courts have not followed this requirement.  The statute should 
be amended to more clearly require de novo review in cases involving 
 132. Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing FLRA v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 508 (2d Cir. 1986) and U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. 
Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 170 (1993)). 
 133. Halpern, 181 F.3d at 287 (quoting FLRA, 958 F.2d at 508). 
 134. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000). 
 135. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2.c, III.C. 
 136. “The Freedom of Information Act has led to the disclosure of waste, fraud, 
abuse and wrongdoing in the federal government.”  Electronic Freedom of Information 
Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 2(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3048, 3048 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).   
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any of the exemptions.  In cases involving Exemptions 1 and 7(A), the 
court should consider affidavits provided by the agency, as well as 
affidavits, arguments, and expert evidence submitted by the plaintiff.  In 
this way, something more like an adversarial process will be 
implemented in FOIA cases, and de novo review, rather than judicial 
rubberstamping based on one-sided assertions, can occur. 
In camera review is already authorized in the statute, but courts have 
avoided its use.  The statute should be amended to require that where 
there is any doubt as to nature of the information and the reasoning of 
the agency regarding the applicability of an exemption, the information 
should be viewed in camera.137  In cases where the information is so 
voluminous as to create a significant burden on the court, a special 
master should be appointed to review the information, summarize it, and 
make a presentation to the court.  This amendment will overrule the test 
commonly used by courts which holds that summary judgment should be 
granted where the agency provides reasonably detailed affidavits 
describing the requested information and establishes a logical link 
between the information exempted and the exemption invoked, where 
there is not evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.138  The 
requirement of some showing of bad faith or controverting evidence has 
acted to eliminate virtually all chance of a plaintiff succeeding in FOIA 
cases.  By empowering the plaintiff to make a case in court, and 
encouraging judges to evaluate agency claims with firsthand knowledge, 
this will be prevented. 
Finally, Exemption 3 is a special case.  FOIA should be amended to 
require courts to conduct review commensurate with the underlying 
statute.  In the case of the National Security Act,139 where the CIA is 
given discretion to determine when information should be withheld to 
protect information sources and methods, the court should conduct a 
review for reasonableness. 
 137. The court in Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing 
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat.) 6287) stated that “[w]hile in camera 
examination need not be automatic, in many situations it will plainly be necessary and 
appropriate.”  This amendment will make it “necessary and appropriate” whenever 
there is any doubt. 
 138. See Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Bell v. 
United States, 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1977) and King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 
F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 139. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000). 




These amendments do not change the policy of open government 
which underlies FOIA. Nor would they act to constrict the affected 
federal agencies so as to prevent them from fulfilling their functions.  
Instead, these policies designate a level of deference to be accorded 
agencies by courts in the FOIA context that strikes an appropriate 
balance between these two policies.  These goals are not mutually 
exclusive, as members of the executive branch might believe.140  Rather, 
both goals are attainable through proper balancing. 
NATHAN SLEGERS 
 140. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 42. 
It is only through a well-informed citizenry that leaders of our nation remain 
accountable to the governed and the American people can be assured that 
neither fraud nor government waste is concealed. 
    The Department of Justice and this Administration are equally committed to 
protecting other fundamental values that are held by our society.  Among them 
are safeguarding our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law 
enforcement agencies, [and] protecting sensitive business information . . . . 
Id. 
